Rationes Decidendi:

(1) (a) The state of recognition is allowed to review the arbitral award from the perspective of compliance of its effects with the fundamental principles of the state’s law [public policy exception pursuant to Article V(2)(b) of the NYConv].

(1) (b) Due to the absence of any uniform and internationally recognized definition of public policy, the term must be interpreted [in each individual case] consistently with jurisprudence and practice in the particular country of recognition and enforcement. Generally, a conflict with public policy would occur if the enforceability of the arbitral award were contrary to the fundamental principles of the constitutional and legal order, the social order, and public policy as such, and the breach would concern an interest which must be insisted on, unequivocally and in every respect.

(1) (c) A conflict with public policy arises in those cases where the fundamental rights of the party to the proceedings were breached in the proceedings in which the respective decision of the foreign court was rendered. Insistence on the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights undoubtedly belongs to such essential principles of Czech law.

(1) (d) The concept of public policy ought to be interpreted in a relatively restrictive manner; mere differences in the procedural laws of a foreign arbitral tribunal and the state of recognition do not establish a conflict with public policy.

(2) (a) Therefore, an argument stating that other parties to the proceedings were represented by more legal counsels, and consequently incurred higher costs of proceedings, focuses only on the issue of interpretation. Application of the words “reasonable” or “adequate” regarding the costs of proceedings, as such, cannot establish a conflict with constitutional law.

(2) (b) If the applicant argues that the costs which the applicant incurred in the part of the proceedings in which the forum ruled on the disqualification of an arbitrator for being biased were unreasonable, then such objection cannot be found justified. It is certainly in the interest of all parties to the proceedings, including the applicant, to make sure that the proceedings and the decision in the merits do not suffer from any defect which would undermine their correctness and equitableness. It is only natural that the costs are paid by the party who did not have standing in the merits and did not succeed in the proceedings.

(3) An objection criticizing the delivery of an arbitral award by a messenger service, not by the holder of a postal license or in any other manner provided for in the CCP, is formalistic and groundless. The main point is that the arbitral award entered the sphere of the applicant, or his or her legal counsel, in compliance with the [UNCITRAL Rules].

(4) An objection that the arbitral award is not stamped with a confirmation of legal force and effect and the confirmation of enforceability is incongruous. The reason is that the [NYConv], which prevails over statutes, namely Section 39 [of the ArbAct [CZE]], does not prescribe any such requirement (cf. Article IV [of the NYConv]). It is sufficient if the arbitral award is final and binding upon the parties and the parties undertake to perform under the award without delay (cf. Article 32(2) of the UNCITRAL Rules).

(5) It is in the interests of all participants in the proceedings for the proceedings and decision on the merits to be free of any defect casting doubt on the correctness and fairness thereof. Proceedings on the disqualification of an arbitrator are therefore proceedings [a stage of proceedings] conducted in the interests of all parties.